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Abstract 
,QPDQXIDFWXULQJ LQGXVWULHVPHPEHUVKLSW\SHVHUYLFHVVXFKDVFDUVKDULQJVHUYLFHVDUHEHFRPLQJZLGHO\XVHG ,W LV LPSRUWDQW WR
HOXFLGDWH WKH XVHIXOQHVV RI VXFK VHUYLFHV LQ OLJKW RI VHUYLFL]LQJ PDQXIDFWXULQJ LQGXVWULHV 7KLV SDSHU GHILQHV DQG DQDO\VHV
µPHPEHUVKLSW\SHVHUYLFHVLQPDQXIDFWXULQJ¶XVLQJDJDPHWKHRUHWLFIUDPHZRUNLQFOXGLQJFRQVXPHUVDQGPDQXIDFWXUHUVZKHUHLQ
SURGXFWV DQG LWV IXQFWLRQV DUH SURYLGHG DV VHUYLFHV 5HVXOWV VKRZ WKDW UHJDUGLQJ VRPH SDUDPHWHUV UHODWHG WR SURGXFWLRQ FRVW
PDQXIDFWXUHUV VKRXOG VKLIW WR VHUYLFL]LQJ WKHLU SURGXFWV LQ FDVHV ZKHUH FRVWV DUH KLJK FRQYHQWLRQDO SURGXFWLRQ DQG VDOHV DV D
SK\VLFDOSURGXFWLVSURILWDEOHLQFDVHVZKHUHFRVWVDUHORZ)XUWKHUPRUHLQWURGXFWLRQRIPHPEHUVKLSW\SHVHUYLFHVFDQ\LHOGJUHDW
SURILWDQGVRFLDOVXUSOXV

7KH$XWKRUV3XEOLVKHGE\(OVHYLHU%96HOHFWLRQDQGRUSHHUUHYLHZXQGHUUHVSRQVLELOLW\RI3URIHVVRU'0RXUW]LVDQG
3URIHVVRU*&KU\VVRORXULV
.H\ZRUGV0HPEHUVKLSW\SHVHUYLFH0DQXIDFWXULQJ,QGXVWU\*DPHWKHRU\
1. Introduction 
,QUHVSRQVHWRJOREDOL]DWLRQVHYHUHSULFHFRPSHWLWLRQ
GHYHORSPHQW RI LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG GLYHUVLILFDWLRQ RI
OLIHVW\OHV PDQXIDFWXULQJ LQGXVWULHV KDYH VKLIWHG WR
VHUYLFH SURYLVLRQ 0DQXIDFWXUHUV QRZ WHQG WR LQFOXGH
PRUHVHUYLFHVLQWKHLUWRWDORIIHULQJVWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHVDOH
RI WKHLU JRRGV WR OHQJWKHQ FXVWRPHU UHODWLRQVKLSV WR
FUHDWH JURZWK RSSRUWXQLWLHV LQ PDWXUHG PDUNHWV WR
EDODQFH WKH HIIHFWV RI HFRQRPLF F\FOHV ZLWK GLIIHUHQW
FDVKIORZVDQGWRUHVSRQGWRLQWHJUDWHGVHUYLFHVROXWLRQ
GHPDQGV >@ 0DLQWHQDQFH RI FRS\ PDFKLQHV DQG WKH
OHDVLQJRIDLUFUDIWHQJLQHVDUHH[DPSOHVRIWKLVVKLIWIURP
PDQXIDFWXULQJWRDVHUYLFHSURYLVLRQ
,QVHUYLFHLQGXVWULHVPDQ\PHPEHUVKLSW\SHVHUYLFHV
H[LVWVXFKDVIUHTXHQWIO\HUSURJUDPVDQGOR\DOW\FDUGV
6RFLDO QHWZRUN VHUYLFHV VXFK DV )DFHERRN DUH DOVR
LQFOXGHG LQ WKLV FDWHJRU\ $V PDQXIDFWXULQJ LQGXVWULHV
VKLIW WR VHUYLFH SURYLVLRQ PHPEHUVKLSW\SH VHUYLFHV
KDYHEHHQLQWURGXFHGLQWRPDQXIDFWXULQJLQGXVWULHV&DU
VKDULQJ LV DQ H[DPSOH RI PHPEHUVKLSW\SH VHUYLFH LQ
PDQXIDFWXULQJ,QWKLVVHUYLFHRQHFDQXVHFDUVZLWKRXW
EX\LQJ WKHP DQG FDQPHUHO\ SD\ IRU WKH WLPH RI XVLQJ
WKHP 7KHUHIRUH D VKLIW RI WKH PDQXIDFWXULQJ LQGXVWU\
WRZDUGV VHUYLFH SURYLVLRQ LV DSSDUHQW DV WKHPRYHPHQW
RI FRQFHSW IURP µVHOOLQJ SURGXFWV¶ ZKLFK LV WKH
WUDGLWLRQDOFRQFHSWRIPDQXIDFWXUH WRµVHOOLQJ IXQFWLRQV
RISURGXFWV¶ZKLFK LVDQHZFRQFHSWRIPDQXIDFWXULQJ
&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKHQXPEHURIPHPEHUVKLSW\SHVHUYLFHV
LV LQFUHDVLQJDQG WKHUROHVRIPHPEHUVKLSW\SHVHUYLFHV
LQPDQXIDFWXULQJDUHWRRLPSRUWDQWWRLJQRUH
$ORQJ ZLWK VXFK D VKLIW VHYHUDO FRQFHSWV VXFK DV
VHUYLFH HQJLQHHULQJ DQG SURGXFWVHUYLFH V\VWHPV 366
KDYH EHHQ SURSRVHG 6HUYLFH HQJLQHHULQJ SURSRVHG E\
$UDL DQG 6KLPRPXUD >@ ZDV GHYHORSHG DORQJ ZLWK
VHUYLFH &$' FDOOHG µ6HUYLFH ([SORUHU¶ >@ 9DULRXV
GHILQLWLRQVRI366H[LVW*RHGNRRSHWDOGHILQHG366DV
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
© 2012 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Professor D. Mourtzis and 
Professor G. Chryssolouris. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
496   K. Okuda et al. /  Procedia CIRP  3 ( 2012 )  495 – 500 
( )
 
 
feasibility of large contracting for the availability and 
enabled OEM provision of the necessary resources. 
However, these studies do not address membership-type 
services directly. 
The field of marketing includes many studies of 
reward programs, which represent a typical case of 
membership-type services. Ahn et al. [5] investigated 
factors leading to customer churn and analyzed the 
effects of membership card programs on customer churn. 
Qin et al. assessed the effects of loyalty program 
membership for customer retention of credit cards [6]. 
These studies examine membership programs in terms of 
customer retention using actual data. Kim et al. [7][8] 
studied reward programs, developing game-theoretical 
models showing that reward programs weaken price 
competition [7] and that reward programs provide firms 
with flexibility in capacity management [8]. 
This study applies previous studies of membership-
type services [9][10] to the manufacturing industry. We 
first define ‘membership-type services in manufacturing’ 
as follows, particularly addressing the original nature of 
products in manufacturing industries. 
Membership-type services in manufacturing’ are 
defined as services for which, to use this service, 
consumers must make a contract with a manufacturer 
who provides the service and must pay not for 
products but for their functions. 
We develop a model of ‘membership-type services in 
manufacturing’ using game theory to examine the 
usefulness of ‘membership-type services in 
manufacturing’. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents a basic model of ‘membership-type 
services in manufacturing’ and two additional models. 
Section 3 describes theoretical analysis of these three 
models. Section 4 concludes this paper. 
2. Modelling 
In this section, ‘membership-type services in 
manufacturing’, which were defined in section 1, are 
modelled (Model 3). We construct two additional 
theoretical models (Model 1 and Model 2) for 
comparison with membership-type services in 
manufacturing. 
• Model 1: Traditional product sales 
Consumers purchase products produced by a 
manufacturer. Then they pay for the products. 
• Model 2: Non-membership-type services in 
manufacturing 
To use this service, consumers pay not for products 
but for the function of products, to a manufacturer 
who provides the services to them. 
• Model 3: Membership-type services in manufacturing 
To use this service, consumers must make a contract 
with a manufacturer who provides services to them. 
They must pay not for products but for their function. 
To examine the usefulness of membership-type 
services in manufacturing, we compare these three 
theoretical models.  
Fig. 1. Framework of traditional products sales 
Fig. 2. Framework of non-membership-type services in manufacturing 
Fig. 3. Framework of membership-type services in manufacturing 
2.1. Basic structure of the models 
Manufacturer   A manufacturer produces one kind of 
product. The manufacturer knows consumers’ 
reservation prices and sets the price, and additionally 
determines the product functionality to maximize its 
profit. 
Consumer   The n consumers make decisions: for 
example, they choose whether to purchase products or 
not and whether they use services or not. They have the 
same reservation prices and know their own reservation 
prices. 
Reservation price   A reservation price is the maximum 
price that consumers can pay for products or services. It 
is shown as r t,F( ) = At + F , where A means 
marginal utility and F means product functionality; t 
stands for time duration of product use. This formula 
means that although high product functionality basically 
indicates high reservation price, the marginal increment 
of reservation price gradually decreases as product 
functionality increases. 
Cost   Here, cost means an amount that is necessary to 
produce a product. It is a function of ‘product 
functionality’, represented byC F( ) = F2 . Therein,  is 
a technological parameter related to production cost.  
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means the relative magnitude of production cost simply, 
expressed as a coefficient in this formula.  also can be 
regarded as a parameter which depends on a 
technological advanced level in production process. 
 In all the models, we introduce the rule of description 
as follows: some parameters such as F and T are 
subscripted by index i  {1, 2, 3} , where i represents the 
number of the models. For example, F1 and t1 
respectively denote the product functionality and time of 
product use in Model 1. 
2.2. Model 1: Traditional products sales 
A manufacturer decides product functionality F1 and 
price p1 of the product to maximize its profit . Each 
consumer makes his/her decision of whether to purchase 
the product or not. The consumer’s reservation price is 
represented by the gray rectangle area in Fig. 5. 
 In this model, the manufacturer’s profit and the utility 
of each consumer can be formulated as follows. The 
manufacturer’s profit is 
1 = np1  nC F1( ) .                        (1) 
The utility of each consumer is 
.         (2) 
Fig. 4. Game structure of traditional products sales 
Fig. 5. Reservation price and time of product use 
2.3. Model 2: Non-membership-type service in 
manufacturing 
A manufacturer decides a service price per unit time 
p2 and product functionality F2 of a product to maximize 
profit . Each consumer makes his/her decision of 
whether to use this service or not and how long he uses 
the service. He/she decides the time of product use t2 to 
maximize his/her utility Ui. The consumer’s reservation 
price r and time of product use are depicted in Fig. 7. 
The number of products q(t) necessary to provide this 
service does not equal the number of users of this service. 
q(t) is defined as , and nt signifies the total 
time of product use by all consumers; t0 denotes the 
maximum time which can be offered with one product. 
In this model, the manufacturer’s profit and the utility 
of each consumer can be formulated as follows. The 
manufacturer’s profit is described as 
2 = n p2dtr p2 C F2( )q t2( ) .             (3) 
The utility of each consumer (gray triangle in Fig. 7) is 
Ui =
(r  p2)dtr p2
0
if use
otherwise
 
 
 
  
.       (4) 
Fig. 6 Framework of non-membership-type services in the 
manufacturing industry 
Fig. 7. Reservation price and time of product use 
2.4. Model 3: Membership-type service in 
manufacturing 
The difference from Model 2 is that a manufacturer 
additionally must decide an entrance fee f to maximize 
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profit . Each consumer makes his/her decision of 
whether to join membership or not. Then, a consumer 
who has joined membership decides how long he uses 
the service. He/she decides the time of product use t3 to 
maximize his utility Ui.  The consumer’s reservation 
price r and time of product use are presented in Fig. 9. 
Products necessary to provide this service are 
similarly defined as q(t). In this model, the 
manufacturer’s profit and the utility of each consumer 
can be formulated as follows. The manufacturer’s profit 
is 
3 = n p3dt + nfr p3 C F3( )q t3( ).             (5) 
The utility of each consumer is 
Ui =
r  p3( )r p3 dt  f if enter
0 otherwise
 
 
 
  
.          (6) 
Fig. 8. Framework of membership-type service in the manufacturing 
industry 
Fig. 9. Reservation price and time of product use 
3. Game theoretic analysis 
3.1. Derivation of theoretical equilibrium 
In this section, we derive Nash equilibrium, which is 
a basic equilibrium concept in game theory. In this paper, 
the equilibrium is obtained as solutions that satisfy the 
following conditions. 
Manufacturer   In a Nash equilibrium, if no consumer 
changes a decision, then the manufacturer has no 
incentive to change its decision from the equilibrium 
solution: that is, in Model 1, under the condition by 
which all consumers decide to purchase products, the 
manufacturer selects actions that maximize the profit. 
Consumers   If the manufacturer does not change the 
decision from a certain point, then each consumer has no 
incentive to change the decision. Especially in our 
models, if a consumer’s utility is greater than or equal to 
zero, then the consumer should continue the same 
behavior because a consumer has only two options such 
as purchase or not and the utility is zero in case of no 
purchase. Therefore, by solving the maximization 
problem max s. t.Ui  0  with respect to each model, 
we can derive the equilibrium. 
• Model 1 
We can obtain the equilibrium by solving max1  
under the following condition: 
Ui = r0
T dt  P1 = F12A  P1  0.            (7) 
At this time,  is a function of F1. We can portray  
graphically as Fig. 10, where F1
*
 is the equilibrium. 
• Model 2 
From Ui  0 , F2 > p2  must be satisfied in the 
model. We solve max2  under F2 > p2 . At this time, 
 is the function of p2 and F2. We can show  
graphically as Fig. 11, where p2
* 
and F2
* 
represent the 
equilibrium. 
• Model 3 
We can obtain the equilibrium by solving max3  
under the following condition. 
Ui = r  p3( )r p3 dt  f
=
F3  p3( )
2
2A
 f  0
.                   (8) 
At this time,  is the function of p3 and F3. We can 
present  graphically as Fig. 12, where p3
*
, F3
*
, and f
*
 
represent the equilibrium. 
Table 1 shows the equilibrium of each model. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Manufacturer’s profit and the equilibrium of Model 1 
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Fig. 11. Manufacturer’s profit and the equilibrium of Model 2 
 
Fig. 12. Manufacturer’s profit and the equilibrium of Model 3 
3.2. Theoretical results 
Mechanism of Model 2 
First, we introduce cost per unit time c2. It is 
formulated as follows. 
c2 =
C F2( )q t2( )
nt2
=
F22
t0
                      (9) 
The manufacturer’s profit and the utility of each 
consumer are shown in Fig. 13. We find that each 
consumer’s utility is positive when F2 > p2 . The 
manufacturer sets the value of p2 and F2 to 
meet F2 > p2 > c2 . When  becomes the greatest, 
then p2 satisfies the following equation. 
 
 
 
Fig. 13. Consumer’s utility and manufacturer’s profit 
p2 =
F2 + c2
2
                             (10) 
We can confirm this from Table 1. 
Mechanism of Model 3   Similarly, we introduce the cost 
per unit time c3. It can be formulated in the same manner 
as formula (9). In this model, p3 = c3  is derived. 
Although the rectangular area formed by functions 
r = p3  and r = At + F3  can be positive, the area is 
exploited by the manufacturer as the entrance fee f. 
Finally, the manufacturer’s profit becomes 
3 = n  f .                            (11) 
From these discussions, we can confirm that the 
membership-type service equilibrium price per unit time 
equals the cost per unit time when reservation prices for 
all consumers are identical, as Nishino et al. [9] 
demonstrated. 
 Comparison between Model 2 and Model 3   Although 
F2 and F3 are the same, p3 is more than twice as much as 
p2 and t3 is twice as much as t2. This results from an 
effect of the entrance fee. Moreover, Table 1 shows that 
another effect of the entrance fee is to reduce the 
consumers’ utility to zero. Because of these effects, 
is twice as much as  and 
 
Table 1. Equilibrium solutions of each model 
 Price 
p 
Functionality 
F 
Entrance fee 
f 
Time of use 
t 
Utility 
Ui 
Profit 
  
Social surplus 
S 
Model 1        
Model 2 
  
 
    
Model 3 
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the social surplus (the sum of consumers’ utility and 
manufacturer’s profit) of Model 3 is larger than that of 
Model 2. Therefore, Model 3 is better than Model 2 in 
that the social surplus of Model 3 is greater than that of 
Model 2 and the equilibrium solution of Model 3 is 
Pareto-optimal. Therefore, manufacturers should 
introduce membership-type services when they begin 
services with their products. 
Comparison of all models   Comparing the 
manufacturer’s profit of each model based on the value 
of , we obtain the following conditions. 
 3 >2  1 if
1024
729t0
2A3

 3  1 >2 if
128
729t0
2A3
 < 1024
729t0
2A3
 1 >3 >2 if  <
128
729t0
2A3
         (12) 
The boundary condition related to   is shown in Fig. 14. 
Fig. 14. Comparison of the manufacturer’s profit of each model 
Next, compared with each model’s social surplus 
based on the value of  , we can obtain the following 
condition. 
           (13) 
Therein, Si denotes the social surplus of model i. These 
conditions demonstrate that when   is large, the 
manufacturing industry should shift to service provision; 
when   is small it should not shift to service provision. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper defines ‘membership-type services in the 
manufacturing industry’. Based on this definition, 
‘traditional products sales’, ’non-membership-type 
services in the manufacturing industry’ 
and ’membership-type services in manufacturing 
industry’ are modelled. From theoretical analyses of 
these three models, the following conclusions were made. 
• Related to ‘  ’ which is a technological parameter 
related to production cost, the manufacturing industry 
should shift to service provision when   is large; it 
should not shift to service provision when   is small. 
• When the manufacturing industry shifts to service 
provision, it should introduce membership-type 
services so that it can gain much profit and social 
surplus can be the greatest possible. 
Considering future prospects, this study is applicable 
to the analysis of models under circumstances of 
incomplete information, i.e., consumers’ reservation 
prices are all different and neither a manufacturer nor 
consumers know the consumers’ reservation prices. 
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